

# Proving Computation Integrity

CS 276: Introduction to Cryptography

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April 8, 2026

# Overview

- 1 Commitment Schemes
- 2 Zero-Knowledge for NP via 3COL
- 3 NIZK Proof Systems
- 4 NIZKs from Trapdoor Permutations
- 5 NIZK for NP: Graph Hamiltonicity

# Commitment Schemes

## Definition 1 (Commitment Scheme)

A *commitment scheme* is a PPT machine  $C$  taking input  $(b, r)$  satisfying:

- **Perfect binding:**  $\forall r, s, C(0, r) \neq C(1, s)$ .
- **Computational hiding:**  $\{C(0, U_n)\} \approx_c \{C(1, U_n)\}$ .

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## Why perfect binding?

Even a single pair  $r, s$  with  $C(0, r) = C(1, s)$  lets a cheating sender open the same commitment as either 0 or 1.

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## Construction

Let  $f$  be an injective OWF. Define  $f'(x, r) := (f(x), r)$ , also an injective OWF with hard-core bit  $B(x, r) := \langle x, r \rangle$ .

$$C(b, x, r) := (f'(x, r), b \oplus B(x, r))$$

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## Proof

- **Perfect binding:** since  $f'$  is injective,  $(x, r) \neq (y, s) \Rightarrow C(0, x, r) \neq C(0, y, s)$ . Also  $C(0, x, r) = (f'(x, r), B(x, r)) \neq (f'(x, r), \overline{B(x, r)}) = C(1, x, r)$ .
- **Computational hiding:** distinguishing  $C(0, U_n)$  from  $C(1, U_n)$  means distinguishing  $B(x, r)$  from  $\overline{B(x, r)}$  given  $f'(x, r)$ , contradicting hard-core bit security.

# Multi-bit Commitments

## Extension to longer messages

Concatenate bit commitments: for messages  $m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_\ell$ , define

$$C(m, r_1, \dots, r_\ell) := C(m_1, r_1) \parallel C(m_2, r_2) \parallel \cdots \parallel C(m_\ell, r_\ell).$$

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## Security

For any two messages  $m_0, m_1$  of the same length:

$$\{C(m_0, U_n)\} \approx_c \{C(m_1, U_n)\}.$$

Follows by a standard hybrid argument over the  $\ell$  positions.

## 3-Coloring is NP-Complete

### Definition 3 ( $n$ -Coloring)

An  $n$ -coloring of graph  $G = (V, E)$  is a function  $c : V \rightarrow \{1, \dots, n\}$  such that  $(i, j) \in E \Rightarrow c(i) \neq c(j)$ .

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### Strategy

A computational zero-knowledge proof for 3COL  $\Rightarrow$  ZK proofs for **all of NP** (via polynomial-time reductions).

# Intuition: Cups and Colors

## Physical protocol

- 1  $P$  asks  $V$  to leave the room.  $P$  samples a random color permutation  $\phi$  and colors the vertices according to  $\phi \circ c$ , then covers all vertices with **cups**.
- 2  $V$  returns and picks one edge;  $P$  uncovers its two endpoints.
- 3 If endpoints share a color,  $V$  **rejects**. Otherwise, repeat with a fresh random  $\phi$ .

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## Key observations

- **Soundness:** if  $G$  is not 3-colorable, some edge is monochromatic;  $V$  catches it with probability  $\geq 1/|E|$ .
- **Zero knowledge:** the random permutation  $\phi$  masks the true coloring;  $V$  learns nothing.
- **Problem:** this requires  $P$  not to recolor after uncovering  $\Rightarrow$  we need **commitments**.

## Protocol $P(x, z) \leftrightarrow V(x)$

Input: graph  $G = (\{1, \dots, n\}, E)$ , witness  $z = 3\text{-coloring } c$ .

- 1 **Commit:**  $P$  picks random permutation  $\pi : \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \{1, 2, 3\}$  and sets  $\beta := \pi \circ c$ . For each  $i \in V$ , computes  $\alpha_i = C(\beta(i), U_n)$ . Sends  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$  to  $V$ .
- 2 **Challenge:**  $V$  samples a random edge  $e = (i, j) \in E$  and sends it to  $P$ .
- 3 **Open:**  $P$  opens commitments  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_j$  (reveals decommitments).
- 4 **Verify:**  $V$  accepts iff decommitments are valid and  $\beta(i) \neq \beta(j)$  are distinct valid colors.

## 3COL: Completeness and Soundness

### Completeness

If  $c$  is a valid 3-coloring and  $\pi$  is any permutation, then  $\beta = \pi \circ c$  is also a valid 3-coloring: every edge has distinct colors.  $V$  always accepts.

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### Soundness (one round)

If  $G$  is **not** 3-colorable, then for any coloring  $\beta$ , at least one edge  $(i,j)$  has  $\beta(i) = \beta(j)$ .

$$\Pr[V \text{ rejects in one round}] \geq \frac{1}{|E|}.$$

Since  $|E| \leq n^2$ , repeating  $\text{poly}(n)$  times amplifies to soundness error  $\leq \text{negl}(n)$ .

### Simulator $S$ for verifier $V^*$

- 1 Sample a random edge  $e = (i, j) \in E$ .
- 2 Assign  $c_i, c_j$  to distinct random values from  $\{1, 2, 3\}$ . Set  $c_k := 1$  for all  $k \neq i, j$ .
- 3 Compute random keys  $r_1, \dots, r_n$  and set  $\alpha_k = C(c_k, r_k)$  for all  $k$ .
- 4 Let  $e' \in E$  be  $V^*$ 's response upon receiving  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ .
- 5 If  $e' \neq e$ : go back to step 1. If restarted more than  $2n|E|$  times, output fail.
- 6 If  $e' = e$ : output  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ ,  $e$ , open  $r_i, r_j$ , and print  $V^*$ 's final output.

## 3COL Simulator (for ZK)

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### Key property

$S$  runs in **polynomial time** (at most  $2n|E|$  restarts), but may output fail. We must show fail occurs with negligible probability.

## Simulator: Bounding Fail Probability

### Claim

For all but finitely many graphs  $G$ ,  $V^*$  outputs  $e' = e$  with probability  $\geq 1/(2|E|)$ .

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## Proof idea

Suppose  $\Pr[e' = e] < 1/(2|E|)$  for infinitely many  $G$ .

- Consider modified simulator  $\tilde{S}$ : set  $c_k = 1$  for **all**  $k$  (including  $i, j$ ).
- Then  $V^*$  cannot distinguish edges  $\Rightarrow \Pr[e' = e] = 1/|E|$  exactly.
- But  $S$  and  $\tilde{S}$  differ only in two committed values ( $c_i, c_j$  vs.  $1, 1$ ).
- Distinguishing  $S$  from  $\tilde{S} \Rightarrow$  breaking hiding of commitment scheme  $C$ .  
Contradiction.

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## Fail probability

$$\Pr[S \text{ outputs fail}] < \left(1 - \frac{1}{2|E|}\right)^{2n|E|} < \frac{1}{e^n} = \text{negl}(n). \square$$

## Simulator: Indistinguishability of Transcripts

### Modified simulator $S'$

Like  $S$ , but given a valid 3-coloring as auxiliary input: in step 2, use a random permutation of the true coloring (instead of setting  $c_k = 1$  for  $k \neq i, j$ ).

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## Argument (two steps)

- 1  $P \leftrightarrow V^*$  and  $S'$  are computationally indistinguishable: they behave identically except  $S'$  may output fail, which happens with  $\text{negl}(n)$  probability.
- 2  $S$  and  $S'$  are computationally indistinguishable: they differ only in committed values. A distinguisher would break computational hiding of  $C$  (distinguishing commitments to a valid 3-coloring vs. commitments with  $c_k = 1$  for  $k \neq i, j$ ).

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Therefore  $P \leftrightarrow V^* \approx_c S' \approx_c S$ , and the protocol is **zero-knowledge**. □

## Theorem 4

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## Proof

- 1 Injective OWFs  $\Rightarrow$  commitment schemes exist (shown earlier).
- 2 The 3COL protocol using commitments is a computational ZK proof for 3COL.
- 3 3COL is NP-complete: for any  $L \in \text{NP}$ , there is a poly-time reduction  $x \mapsto G_x$  such that  $x \in L \iff G_x \in \text{3COL}$ .
- 4 To prove  $x \in L$ : reduce to  $G_x$ , run the ZK proof for  $G_x$ . □

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## Motivation

Can the prover send a **single message** to the verifier (no interaction)?

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## Common Reference String (CRS) model

Both prover and verifier have access to a common random public string  $\sigma$  (trusted to be random by both).

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NIZK = non-interactive zero-knowledge proof in the CRS model.

## Definition 5 (NIZK Proof System)

A NIZK for language  $L$  is efficient algorithms  $(K, P, V)$ :

- 1 **Key generation:**  $\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k)$  generates the CRS.
- 2 **Prover:**  $\pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, x, \omega)$  produces a proof (given witness  $\omega$ ).
- 3 **Verifier:**  $V(\sigma, x, \pi) \in \{0, 1\}$  accepts or rejects.

## Completeness

$\forall x \in L, \forall \omega \in R_L(x)$ :

$$\Pr[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k), \pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, x, \omega) : V(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1] = 1.$$

# NIZK: Properties

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## Non-adaptive soundness

$\forall x \notin L$ :

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## Adaptive soundness (stronger)

$$\Pr[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k) : \exists (x, \pi) \text{ s.t. } x \notin L \text{ and } V(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1] = \text{negl}(k).$$

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# NIZK: Zero-Knowledge Property

## Non-adaptive zero-knowledge

$\exists$  PPT simulator  $S$  such that  $\forall x \in L, \omega \in R_L(x)$ , the following are computationally indistinguishable:

### Real:

- 1  $\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k)$
- 2  $\pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, x, \omega)$
- 3 Output  $(\sigma, \pi)$

### Simulated:

- 1  $(\sigma, \pi) \leftarrow S(1^k, x)$
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## Key point

The simulator produces **both**  $\sigma$  and  $\pi$  together. If  $S$  could not generate  $\sigma$ , the definition would be trivial (verifier could run  $S$  itself instead of interacting with  $P$ ).

## Adaptive zero-knowledge

$\exists$  PPT simulator  $(S_1, S_2)$  such that  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , the following are computationally indistinguishable:

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### Simulated:

- 1  $(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k)$
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Here  $\tau$  is local state (“trapdoor”) passed from  $S_1$  to  $S_2$ : the simulator sets up  $\sigma$  in a way that lets it later produce fake proofs for any  $x$  chosen by  $\mathcal{A}$ .

## Non-Adaptive $\Rightarrow$ Adaptive Soundness

### Theorem 6

*Given a NIZK  $(K, P, V)$  that is non-adaptively sound, we can construct a NIZK  $(K', P', V')$  that is adaptively sound.*

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## Construction

Repeat  $(K, P, V)$  polynomially many times with fresh randomness.  $V'$  accepts iff  $V$  accepts in **every** repetition. Ensure soundness error  $\leq 2^{-2P(k)}$  (where  $P(k)$  bounds  $|x|$ ).

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## Proof

Call  $\sigma$  “bad for  $x_0$ ” if  $\exists \pi$  s.t.  $V(\sigma, x_0, \pi) = 1$  (and  $x_0 \notin L$ ). By non-adaptive soundness:  $\Pr_{\sigma}[\text{bad for } x_0] \leq 2^{-2P(k)}$ . By union bound over all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^{P(k)}$ :

$$\Pr[\sigma \leftarrow K'(1^k) : \exists (x, \pi) \text{ s.t. } V'(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1] \leq 2^{P(k)} \cdot 2^{-2P(k)} = 2^{-P(k)}. \square$$